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Abstract: At issue in this paper is the unfin-
ished dialogue between hermeneutic phenome-
nology and hermeneutic logic. The paper touch-
es upon two historical contexts of this dialogue. 
In scrutinizing them I discuss the relationship 
between philosophical hermeneutics and non-
representationalist epistemology. The view gets 
spelled out that the norms of truthfulness, 
objectivity, empirical adequacy, and other epis-
temological characteristics of interpretation 
become generated within characteristic herme-
neutic situations. By elaborating on Heidegger’s 
nexus between projected understanding and 
interpretative articulation, the notion of herme-
neutic fore-structuring of interpretative practic-
es is introduced. Scrutinizing this notion allows 




Key Words: Hermeneutic, Phenomenology, 
Epistemology,  Interpretation. 
Resumen: El tema de este artículo es el diálo-
go inacabado entre la fenomenología hermen-
éutica y la lógica hermenéutica. El artículo toma 
dos contextos históricos de este diálogo. Al 
investigarlos, discuto la relación entre la her-
menéutica filosófica y la epistemología no-
representacionalista. Esta visión explica que las 
normas de veracidad, la objetividad, la adecua-
ción empírica y otras características episte-
mológicas de la interpretación llegan a generar-
se dentro de situaciones hermenéuticas carac-
terísticas. Al elaborar el nexo de Heidegger 
entre la comprensión proyectada y la articula-
ción interpretativa, se introduce la noción de 
pre-estructuración hermenéutica de las prácti-
cas interpretativas. Investigar esta noción per-









1. THE WEAK-STRONG HOLISM CONTROVERSY AND ITS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
This paper is a reflection upon a recent controversy between two schools of 
phenomenological philosophy of the human sciences. Against the background of 
a critical appraisal of this controversy I will put forward a version of double 
hermeneutics that revises at the same time Heidegger’s way of circumscribing 
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the ontological difference in hermeneutic phenomenology. It is a revision that is 
in line with the critique of the project of Being and Time offered by some of 
Dilthey’s students. Thus, the outcome of the contemporary weak-strong holism 
controversy in phenomenology and philosophy of the human sciences promises 
to complete an important cycle of debates in the development of the post-
Diltheyan philosophical hermeneutics. 
There is a standard stance against ontologizing interpretation, i.e. against 
construing interpretation in terms of an existential phenomenon ascribed to the 
modes of being-in-the-world. According to its principal argument, the 
ontologization of hermeneutics is doomed to an irrecoverable skepticism. Mak-
ing interpretation a dimension of Heidegger’s “thrown project” (and ascribing to 
interpretative knowledge a “derivative status” in accordance with the scenario 
of the derivability of “apophantic as” from “hermeneutic as”) precludes the pos-
sibility to treat interpretation as an autonomous cognitive procedure subordi-
nated to epistemological norms and criteria for validity and objectivity. By ad-
mitting the priority of “ontological interpretation” over “epistemic interpreta-
tion” – so the argument from the standard position goes – one fails to defeat 
the skepticism about the validity and objectivity of particular interpretations, 
and to cope with the conflict of competing interpretations. In other words, there 
is a lack of rules in the ontological approach for singling out the best (or at 
least the more appropriate) interpretation. The standard stance is guided by a 
methodological imperative advocated by several prominent analytical philoso-
phers. On this imperative, if a set of constrains fails to yield a unique interpre-
tation, then one ought to search for further as yet unarticulated constrains on 
interpretation. For several reasons the ontological approach to interpretation 
cannot meet this methodological imperative. Therefore, it is ineffective and un-
reliable. 
By implication, the ontological approach is accused for having no resources 
to settle disputes between competing interpretative research programs (i.e. 
programs based on alternative methodologies of interpretation in disciplines like 
cultural anthropology, literary criticism, micro-history, religious studies, or art 
history). It suffers from an incurable normative deficit. In stressing the total 
context-dependence of interpretation embedded in the modes of being-in-the-
world, the supporters of the ontological approach fail to handle the problem of 
the indeterminacy of interpretation. On the standard stance’s critique, the kind 
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of skepticism brought into play by the ontological-holistic-contextual portrait of 
interpretation can be only eliminated through supplying or combining the latter 
with (or at least restricting it by) a rational-comparative approach to interpreta-
tion that is capable to determine it epistemologically. An external normative 
reflection upon the context-dependent interpretation should overcome its nor-
mative deficit, thereby justifying epistemologically the interpretation’s outcome. 
The ontological approach to interpretation has no potentiality to generate such 
a reflection. 
The view that the ontological reformulation of interpretation avoids any 
epistemological specification in terms of validity, empirical adequacy, truthful-
ness, and objectivity is most cogently typified by James Bohman1. On his ac-
count, this reformulation opens the door to heavy suspicions about the meth-
odological value of interpretation. It implies “strong holism” (as an anti-
normative counterpart of the ontological approach) about the contextual inde-
terminacy of interpretation that forecloses the application of norms and criteria. 
The transcendental argument for this holism involves four premises. According 
to the first two of them, interpretation is predicated on a part-whole circularity 
(the ineliminability of the hermeneutic circle), and it occurs only against the 
background of an unscpecifiable interrelatedness of practices. For Bohman as a 
typical exponent of the standard stance, these premises are obligatory for each 
kind of interpretation: Circular and perspectival aspects are not extraneous fea-
tures but transcendental conditions for having interpretative practices. Howev-
er, strong holism is based on two further premises which are unacceptable. 
They stipulate the insurmountable limits of interpretation’s epistemic character-
ization, and the impossibility to draw a demarcation between true and false in-
terpretations. The only methodological recommendation that strong holism 
might provide is that one should follow the rationality of phronesis (practical 
wisdom) in the process of interpretation. 
In order to “save” interpretative holism from skepticism and to subject in-
terpretation’s contextual indeterminacy to normative-epistemological rationali-
ty, Bohman suggests a modified transcendental argument. The premises of the 
inevitability of hermeneutic circularity and the unspecifiability of the back-
 
 
1 See, in particular, James Bohman, New Philosophy of Social Science, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
MIT Press, 1991, pp. 102-144. 
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ground interrelatedness of practices remain preserved, while the other two 
premises get replaced by the assumptions that the background poses only an 
enabling condition that by no means limits the epistemic characterization of 
interpretation, and the later consists of knowledge claims that can be testified 
by intersubjectively accepted norms and criteria. The enabling condition is not 
to be confused with a “limiting condition” that makes impossible to decide and 
choose normatively between interpretations on the basis of evidence. 
The revisited transcendental argument leads to what Bohman calls “weak 
holism” – a doctrine which is in harmony with the standard stance2. What is 
meant by this expression is a generalized view about the epistemological nature 
of interpretation developed in line of post-empiricist philosophy of science. 
Weak holism is a view about interpretation’s contextual indeterminacy and cir-
cularity that allows one to treat the outcomes of interpretations as knowledge 
(claims and beliefs) based on evidence. Treating interpretations in such a man-
ner is a precondition for forging an epistemological framework of appraising 
interpretative knowledge. To establish a non-skeptical conclusion about the ho-
list-circular-contextual nature of interpretation amounts to subordinating her-
meneutics to normativity of getting empirically warrant knowledge. In 
Bohman’s eyes, a universalizing of hermeneutics beyond the scope of (post-
empiricist) epistemology and its normative rationality would imply universal 
philosophical skepticism. 
In the final reckoning, what Bohman suggests can be formulated in terms 
of the following dilemma – either accepting epistemological skepticism as the 
ultimate philosophical position with regard to the nature of interpretation, or 
recasting hermeneutics as a special field of (weakly normative, post-empiricist) 
epistemology. For those who believe in the universalizing of hermeneutics (as 
an ongoing program) but repudiate any form of epistemological skepticism, 
there is the obligation to get rid of this depressing dilemma. To make some ini-
tial steps in that direction let me call the attention to the fact that in Bohman’s 
formulation of the transcendental argument for strong holism wrong is the 
premise of background’s unspecifiability. To stress again, Bohman retains this 
premise also in his formulation of the transcendental argument for weak ho-
 
 
2 On the way in which the distinction between strong and weak holism is introduced and justified see, 
James Bohman, “Holism without Skepticism: Contextualism and the Limits of Interpretation”, in: David 
R. Hiley et al. (eds.), The Interpretive Turn, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 129-154. 
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lism. According to him, the background of practices and beliefs is an amorphous 
milieu. Interpretation is simply immersed in this milieu. Moreover, it is doomed 
to be normatively blind with regard to what should be counted as its pertinent 
background. From a hermeneutic point of view, however, the background is 
inseparable from the horizon of interpretation. The background that continually 
depends on the projection of horizon is the ongoing fore-structuring of interpre-
tation. It is this projection in the interpretative process that makes the back-
ground possible. The way in which the horizon of possibilities becomes appro-
priated in this process delineates and specifies constantly the background. Yet 
the latter in its turn constantly provokes (through its variability) the projection 
of new possibilities. Thus, background of practices and projected horizon of 
possibilities are involved in an ongoing mutual reinforcement that progressively 
rules out the background’s unspecifiability. 
In failing to address the issue of how the projection of horizon and delinea-
tion of background are united in a relation of co-specification in the process of 
interpretation, the supporters of the standard stance are unable to transcend 
Bohman’s dilemma. It is this relation that brings into being an important aspect 
of what I will call a hermeneutic fore-structure of the constitution of meaning. 
More specifically, I will argue that the background of practices in an interpreta-
tive process is specifiable as a hermeneutic fore-structure of generating 
knowledge claims and cognitive structures. Scrutinizing this notion helps one to 
come to grips with issue of how norms of epistemic truthfulness, objectivity and 
validity are engendered in this process, and accordingly, how the very process 
gets specified epistemologically. On a further claim that will be advocated, the 
ontological approach to interpretation is capable to revealing in the contextual-
ized interpretative practices a potentiality to a successful dealing with the as-
pects of normative indeterminacy. My contention is that an ontological ap-
proach to interpretation grounded upon a theory of double hermeneutics allows 
one to hold strong (ontological) holism, while avoiding skepticism about the 
epistemological specifiability of interpretative practices3. 
Bohman like many others spells out in a quite definite manner the standard 
stance against the ontological recasting of interpretation. His framework of ar-
 
 
3 See in this regard also Dimitri Ginev, “Rhetoric and Double Hermeneutics in the Human Sciences”, 
Human Studies, 21(1998), pp. 259-271; and Dimitri Ginev, “Doppelte Hermeneutik und 
Konstitutionstheorie”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 55(2007), pp. 679-688. 
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gumentation is provided by the theories of science’s normative rationality. Yet 
this is not the standard stance’s original framework of criticism. In fact, the 
standard stance is rooted in the first place in a quite tendentious reading of the 
history of modern hermeneutics. It is a reading that rejects the “post-Diltheyan 
turn” of interpretation theory. The main merit of Dilthey’s (methodological) 
hermeneutics – a program that he developed parallel to (and to a certain extent 
in a competition with) his version of “descriptive psychology” – was the way of 
constituting “individual wholes” as the human sciences’ objects of inquiry4. The 
individual wholes are neither “singulars” (particular cultural-historical facts) nor 
are they reducible to merely empirical data (and data-models)5. The methodol-
ogy of their constitution is neither that of teleological reconstruction nor that of 
structural-functional explanatory models. The constitution of individual wholes 
proceeds by means of interplay between the self-understanding of the historical 
agents who are under study and the interpretative grasping of this self-
understanding’s objectifications. (Presumably, the agents’ self-understanding 
becomes expressed in all cultural manifestations of the life-form under study6.) 
The interplay is built upon the model of the part-whole hermeneutic circle. 
Consequently, an individual whole (for instance, an artistic style, an epoch’s 
“cultural spirit”, or a historical type of moral consciousness) constituted by this 
interplay gets never closed in itself and finalized in accordance with epistemo-
logical criteria for the research process’s finality. Whether the hermeneutic cir-
cularity can be kept under a methodological (and normative) control remains an 
open question in Dilthey’s work. However, the very idea of a circulative rela-
tionship between (the particular manifestations of the) life-forms’ self-
understanding and the interpretative constitution of meaningful wholes pro-
 
 
4 On the interrelations between hermeneutics and descriptive psychology in Dilthey’s work see Rudolf 
Makkreel, Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Sciences, Princeron: Princeton University Press, 1975; 
Frithjof Rodi, Das strukturierte Ganze. Studien zum Werk von Wilhelm Dilthey, Velbrück: Weilerswist 
2003. 
5 See on this claim, for instance, Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, Band VII: Der Aufbau der 
geschictlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, hrsg. von Bernhard Groethuysen, Leipzig und Berlin, 
1927,  p. 212. 
6 According to a core doctrine of Dilthey’s program exposed in his seminal work The Formation of the 
Historical World in the Human Sciences, the human sciences are called into existence in order to elabo-
rate on strategies for cognizing the historical world by interpreting the discursive and symbolic embodi-
ments of historical agents’ lived experience. In the production and expressivity of these embodiments 
the interpretative reflexivity plays an irreplaceable role. The paramount concept of 
Wirkungszusammenhang (productive nexus) conveys main aspects of the unavoidable situatedness of 
lived experience. Reflexivity is the interpretative production of cultural embodiments (in Dilthey’s terms, 
die Lebensäußerungen, the life’s expressivity) within the productive nexus. Thus, the human sciences 
achieve an interpretative cognizing of life’s reflexive expressivity. This is the most succinct formula of 
the human sciences’ double hermeneutics. 
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voked a profound change of the traditional theory of interpretation oriented 
toward methodical and logical problematic. To be sure, there was a strong ten-
dency to ontologizing interpretation involved in this idea. (This tendency got 
established in Dilthey’s school despite the fact that the master vehemently op-
posed an ontological reformulation of Lebensphilosophie.) This was the advent 
of philosophical hermeneutics. The post-Diltheyan turn consists in the develop-
ment of versions of philosophical hermeneutics as a result of different ap-
proaches to the way in which Dilthey designed the interplay constituting mean-
ingful wholes. 
Philosophers like Georg Misch, Martin Heidegger, Hans Lipps, Helmuth 
Plessner, and Josef König, who in the 1920s undertook this turn in the after-
math of a (re)publication of Dilthey’s basic works, have been accused by those 
who hold the arguments of the standard stance for not being preoccupied with 
the traditional hermeneutic problematic about the meaning of texts and dis-
courses. On this accusation, the aforementioned philosophers were not inter-
ested in the original function of hermeneutics as the art of interpretation of au-
thor’s intentions whose discursive and textual embodiment produces meaning. 
Thus, they ignored the philological aspects of hermeneutics, transforming it 
either into a theory of “life-forms’ expressivity” (Misch and König), or existential 
analytic (Heidegger), or a phenomenological theory of the human finitude and 
situatedness (Lipps), or a prelude to philosophical anthropology as a theory of 
“eccentric positionality” (Plessner). By detaching hermeneutics from empirical 
science, they divorced it from the epistemological profile of scientific rationality. 
According to the critics of this detachment, the authors of the post-Diltheyan 
turn concentrated in their historical reflections exclusively on the theological 
side of traditional hermeneutics (for instance, anti-Enlightenment exegetical 
conceptions related to the interpretative dimensions of God’s immanent tran-
scendence). In so doing, they completely neglected those traditional concep-
tions which were preoccupied with the analytical (methodical and formal-
logical) aspects of disclosing the authors’ textually embodied intentions. 
On a corollary to this criticism, the contemporary historians of modern 
hermeneutics who subscribe to the paradigm-change provoked by Dilthey’s an-
ti-naturalist philosophy of the human science and his program for a “critique of 
182 DIMITRI GINEV 
 
 182 Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 4/I (2013): Razón y Vida. 
 
historical reason” go on to justify the progressive divergence of philosophical 
hermeneutics from rationally reproducible procedures of interpretation7. The 
critique of the post-Diltheyan turn, however, aims not merely at a new histori-
ography of interpretation theory. Its basic goal is rather to “de-legitimize” the 
philosophical projects developed along the lines of this turn. To put it in a qua-
si-Heideggerian parlance, the critique aims at destructing the tradition(s) of 
these projects in order to get the chance of repeating the authentic questions of 
interpretation theory8. In accomplishing this job, the critics believe to regain 
the status of hermeneutics as an auxiliary discipline of normative epistemology. 
(Accordingly, Continental philosophical hermeneutics will prove to be an ex-
travagant deviation from the “rational development” of interpretation theory.) 
The critics are inclined to conceive of the development of the traditional (pre-
Diltheyan) hermeneutics as a series of consecutive conceptions that are more 
or less predecessors of Quine’s “radical translation”, Davidson’s “radical inter-
pretation”, and all versions of the “principle of charity” discussed and advocated 
in analytical philosophy. Hence, their “de-legitimizing” historiography of modern 
hermeneutica generalis (i.e. the traditional art of interpretation after the exten-
sion of the exegetical principle of sola scriptura as a general theory of texts’ 
meaning) serves at the same time the task of legitimizing the authenticity of 
the way in which the problematic of interpretation is discussed in analytic phi-
losophy. 
I am not going to enter on this occasion the “historiographic battle” for 
hermeneutics. To be sure, the contemporary versions of the principle of charity 
have much in common with the pre-Kantian views about the aequitas 
hermeneutica. Yet the post-Diltheyan turn was also “prepared” by several de-
 
 
7 Notoriously, this kind of historiography of hermeneutics was launched by Dilthey himself. The point of 
departure is his celebrated essays The Rise of Hermeneutics of 1900. See Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte 
Schriften, Band V: Die geistige Welt. Einleiting in die Philosophie des Lebens. Erste Hälfte: Abhandlungen 
zur Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften, hrsg. von Georg Misch, Leipzig und Berlin, 1924, pp. 317-
338. 
8 See in this regard, Axel Bühler (Hrsg.), Unzeitgemässe Hermeneutik. Verstehen und Interpretation im 
Denken der Aufklärung, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1994; Lutz Danneberg, “Philosophische und 
methodische Hermeneutik”, Philosophia Naturalis, 32(1995), pp. 249-269; Oliver Scholz, „Zur 
systematischen Bedeutung der Aufklärungshermeneutiken“, Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 
21(1996), pp. 156-162; Oliver Scholz, „Die Vorstruktur des Verstehens. Ein Beitrag zur Klärung des 
Verhältnisses zwischen traditioneller Hermeneutik und ‚philosophischer Hermeneutik’“, in: Die 
Geschichte der Hermeneutik und die Methodik der textinterpretierenden Disziplinen, hsrsg. von  Jörg  
Schönert und Friedrich Vollhardt, Berlin und New York: de Gruyter, 2005, pp. 443-462. Denis Thouard, 
„Wie Flacius zum ersten Hermeneutiker der Moderne wurde. Dilthey, Twesten, Schleiermacher und die 
Historiographie der Hermeneutik“, in: Die Geschichte der Hermeneutik und die Methodik der 
textinterpretierenden Disziplinen, hsrsg. von  Jörg  Schönert und Friedrich Vollhardt, Berlin und New 
York: de Gruyter, 2005, pp. 265-280.  
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velopments in the traditional hermeneutics. More specifically, it was prepared 
by those conceptions which were not succumbed to the paradigm of interpret-
ing the author’s intentionality incorporated in texts and discourses9. (Cases in 
point are the conceptions which emphasized the irreducibility of the “hermeneu-
tic truth” to empirical or logical truth.) The message of these developments and 
conceptions is that hermeneutics is something more than a sub-discipline of 
(normative or naturalized) epistemology. However, the irreducibility of “onto-
logical hermeneutics” to an epistemological enterprise does not imply (pace 
Heidegger and many others) an anti-epistemological position. 
By spelling out the concept of a “characteristic hermeneutic situation” (as a 
further specification of the notion of hermeneutic fore-structure)10, I will argue 
for the possibility of an epistemologically specifiable ontological hermeneutics in 
the remainder. Strangely enough, all post-Diltheyan versions of philosophical 
hermeneutics draw heavily on the distinction between the natural and the hu-
man sciences, stressing the interpretative-dialogical nature of the latter and the 
objectivist-monological specificity of the former. This is strange because the 
claim of the universality of hermeneutics requires demonstrating the interpreta-
tive-constitutive dimension of the natural-scientific inquiry as well. (If one fails 
to address this dimension properly, one would be committed to a universal 
hermeneutics that is not combating scientism as a wrong ideological identifica-
tion of science’s profile but science itself. In short, this would be a hermeneu-
tics struggling not for anti-scientism but for anti-science.) 
More recent versions of philosophical hermeneutics (like that of Charles 
Taylor) acknowledge the interpretative character of practices like experimenta-
tion, calibration of instruments, construction of theory’s data-models, construc-
tion of theory’s mathematical formalism, and so on. They do not deny science’s 
interpretative dimension. Nonetheless they insist on the doubly hermeneutic 
organization of the human-scientific research as an irremovable distinctive fea-
ture. On their view, the interpretative character of natural-scientific practices 
do not imply the need for a double hermeneutics. Though I am not striving for 
 
 
9 On reconstruction of the history of modern hermeneutics as preparing the rise of philosophical herme-
neutics see, for instance, Jean Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1994; Harald Schnur, Schleiermachers Hermeneutik und ihre Vorgeschichte, Stuttgart 
und Weimar: Metzler, 1994. 
10 On the notion of hermeneutic fore-structure see Dimitri Ginev, “On the Hermeneutic Fore-Structure of 
Scientific Research”, Continental Philosophy Review, 32(1999), pp. 143-168. 
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undoing the philosophically significant distinction between the natural and the 
human sciences, I believe that the phenomena involved in the double herme-
neutics cannot provide the necessary criterion for carrying out this distinction 
effectively. Albeit operating in a quite different manner as compared with the 
human sciences, the double hermeneutics is to be established by a theory of 
natural-scientific practices too. This theory will occupy a central place in the 
remainder. 
In what follows I shall proceed in three steps: (1) examining the existential 
analytic of meaning constitution as a mediator between the methodological and 
the ontological theory of interpretation; (2) elaborating on concept of the her-
meneutic fore-structure of science’s interpretative practices as a specification of 
existential analytic’s nexus of understanding-interpretation; (3) refuting the 
arguments for subordinating hermeneutics to epistemology by working out the 
concept of the characteristic hermeneutic situation. 
 
 
2. ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE AND DOUBLE HERMENEUTICS 
 
The double hermeneutics (qua a methodology of the interpretative scienc-
es) might be developed independently of the ontological approach as this is 
illustrated, in particular, by the conceptions of Mary Hesse and Anthony 
Giddens. The reverse however is not valid: the ontological theory of interpreta-
tion involves necessarily a double hermeneutics. To demonstrate the original 
motivation for introducing double hermeneutics, let me take up the discussion 
of Dilthey’s interplay of a life-form’s self-understanding and the interpretative 
constitution of life-form’s meaningful whole as an object of inquiry. Following 
the claims of ungroundability, unfathomability, and inscrutability of “life’s dy-
namics”, Dilthey elaborates on this interplay in order to prevent a superimposi-
tion of extraneous interpretative schemes upon the life-forms as individual 
wholes. The double hermeneutics allows one an intrinsic interpretation of life-
form’s meaningful self-articulation. Yet the double hermeneutics does not imply 
a lack of epistemic distance in this intrinsic interpretation. Dilthey tried to ad-
dress the distance issue by introducing the distinction between the “reflexive 
awareness” (Innewerden) of the life-forms and the “reflective interpretation” 
within human-scientific experience. The way of devising such an interpretation 
implies at the same time a transition to a kind of transcendental reflection 
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specifying the constitution of individual wholes as research objects. It is this 
reflection that reveals conditions for possibility of a life-form’s expressivity 
within (what Dilthey calls) the life-form’s “productive nexus” 
(Wirkungszusammenhang). The interpretative research’s attitude proves to be 
both hermeneutic (predicated on the circularity of the constitution of an indi-
vidual whole) and transcendental. By serving a transcendental function, the 
hermeneutic circle of interpretative constitution of objects of inquiry effectuates 
an epistemic distance. The same overlapping of hermeneutic and transcenden-
tal circularity will take place in the existential analytic as well11. 
Dilthey emphasized successfully the need of double hermeneutics in the in-
terpretative sciences. Yet his philosophy of these sciences does not suffice to 
approaching closer the double hermeneutics’ ontological and methodological 
aspects. In his late essay “Abstractions from the life of our wills” Dilthey tries to 
work out some of these aspects in the perspective of an extension of traditional 
logic as “logic of life” (the logic of life-forms’ formation). The project of this ex-
tension was accomplished by Georg Misch whose “hermeneutic logic of 
discursivity (Diskursivität)” managed to integrate the methodology of doubly 
hermeneutic constitution of human-scientific objects of inquiry in a general the-
ory of life’s discursive expressivity12. 
In what follows, however, I will restrain from dealing further with the 
Diltheyan tradition. Instead, the attention will be concentrated entirely on the 
road to double hermeneutics via a re-reading of existential analytic’s under-
standing-interpretation nexus and the ontic-ontological difference. Leaning on 
the existential analytic, one realizes that the double hermeneutics is not simply 
an “interpretation of interpretation” but rather a process of unfolding on two 
levels the interpretative self-understanding of the agents under study as they 
constitute their form of life (and life-worlds). On each level one is dealing with 
specific interpretative circularity, and the task of the double hermeneutics as a 
methodology is to figure out an integral hermeneutic circularity of the research 
 
 
11 In existential analytic, however, the overlapping in question proceeds in a twofold manner: on ontic as 
well as on ontological level. In his criticism on Dlithey from the mid 1920s Heidegger stresses the impos-
sibility to defend the need of transcendental reflection while holding the “ontological in-difference of life”. 
See, in this regard, Martin Heidegger, „Wilhelm Diltheys Forschungsarbeit und der gegenwärtige Kampf 
um eine historische Weltanschauung. 10 Vorträge (Gehalten in Kassel vom 16. IV. –  21. IV. 1925)“, in: 
Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften, Band 8, 1992-1993, 143-
180, hier: 158. 
12 See Dimitri Ginev, Das hermeneutische Projekt Georg Mischs, Wien: Passagen Verlag, 2011. 
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process. My principal disagreement with the standard stance (as discussed in 
the previous section) can be epitomized by the following claim: By devising the 
integral circle of the interpretative constitution of meaning, one will be able to 
specify epistemological constrains on ontic level’s interpretation. This task re-
quires to addressing in the first place the issue of meaning constitution in her-
meneutic phenomenology. 
    Notoriously, in Being and Time interpretation as an existentiale is as-
signed to the meaning of being. Yet the access to that (“fundamental-
ontological”) meaning is through the analysis of the interpretative constitution 
of meaning and the articulation of the world. The analysis takes into account 
the dual status of meaning with respect to the ontological difference. On ontic 
level, all entities that can be thematized are laden with meaning. Even the 
purely natural objects are not an exception since the practice of scientific 
thematization makes them meaningful and culturally contextualized. By con-
trast, the meaning of being (i.e. the ontological meaning of the existentiales) is 
never given to the “positive experience” of scientific thematization. The onto-
logical meaning is a pure “nothingness” for this experience. The constitution of 
meaning in cultural existence is a process that mediates between the ontologi-
cal and the ontic meaning. This is why an analysis of the constitution of mean-
ing makes possible the transition from the ontic (empirical) to the ontological 
(transcendental) level. The constitution involves at once the modes of empirical 
manifestation of meaning and the a priori conditions for a meaningful articula-
tion of the world. The analysis presupposes that interpretation has an “ontic 
universality” in all practices within-the-world since the constitution of meaning 
and the articulation of cultural worlds take place inevitably in these practices. 
Thus, interpretation is at once an ontological moment that characterizes the 
meaning of being, and a universal ontic (i.e. empirically accessible) event. The 
empirical accessibility to the ontic universality is to be attained, in particular, by 
(what after Bourdieu is called) a “theory of practices”. 
In the existential analytic, the expression of “concernful dealings” stays for 
the concept of practices. Speaking in Heidegger’s terms, “care” that unites on-
tologically existentiality, facticity, and being-fallen of Dasein’s being-in-the-
world is organized as an interrelatedness of concernful dealings. Care is not a 
special attitude towards the self, but the phenomenological totality of being-in-
the-world, whereas existence absorbed in the interrelatedness of the dealings 
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with things that are ready-to-hand is defined as “concern”. Both the existential 
totality of care and the concern with what is ready-to-hand are essentially in-
terpretative. Yet the former is distinguished by ontological universality while the 
latter by ontic universality of interpretation. Every concrete (specified by cul-
tural patterns) attitude of interpretative concern is grounded in care. In another 
formulation, the modes of interpretative concern are ontic possibilities of being-
as-care. The things that are ready-to-hand within the interrelatedness of prac-
tices “have been interpreted in the horizon of the they”13. Heidegger makes the 
case that the everyday-routine interpretation of the they constrains the possible 
options of (the inauthentic) interpretative-deliberative choice within-the-world. 
One chooses possibilities projected by they’s routine practices (“the average 
everydayness of concern”). The interpretative concern within-the-world be-
comes blind to alternative possibilities. 
In the interpretative sciences, applying double hermeneutics proceeds from 
the ontic investigation of meaningful cultural diversities – think on a cultural-
anthropological investigation based on “thick description”, for instance – to dis-
closing structures of meaning constitution within the cultural worlds. (A case in 
point is the changing structures of identity’s narrative construction of an ethnic 
or a confessional community. These structures involve configurations of histori-
cal self-understanding, cultural memory, intersubjective states-of-mind, sym-
bolic expressivity, and techniques of narration.) From a Heideggerian point of 
view, disclosing such structures is by no means an ontological study. Yet in this 
hermeneutic investigation, one employs transcendental arguments in interpret-
ing the factual outcome of the ontic investigation. In so doing, one ascribes to 
the disclosed structures existential-ontological moments. Thus, the human-
scientific double hermeneutics creates a definitive methodical order of moving 
from ontic issues to an ontologically relevant problematic. In the existential an-
alytic the ontico-ontological order becomes reversed as regards this methodical 
order. The interpretative articulation of the world (the ontological status of in-
terpretation) proves to be not an explication of interpretation’s empirical uni-




13 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, San Francis-
co: Harper, 1962, p. 239. 
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The same conclusions are to be held with regard to understanding which al-
so is distinguished by an ontic and an ontological status. To be sure, the exis-
tential-analytic construal of this term runs against the commonsensical conceiv-
ing of it. Leaning on the linguistic intuition, the primary connotation of the term 
“understanding” is related to the contextualized mental activity. (One under-
stands something by having recourse to the context in which this something is 
placed, or by grasping intentions incorporated in speech acts or actions.) There 
is, however, even in the commonsensical meaning of understanding a hidden 
connotation that differs significantly from the meaning of a cognitive event. 
This connotation, which lays bare the intuitive base of the existential-
phenomenological construal of meaning, becomes clear when one says that one 
understands oneself upon the possibilities one can appropriate in one’s mode of 
being-in-the-world. Applied to an interpretative research process, this means, 
in particular, that a scientific community understands itself as being projected 
upon possibilities of articulation of what is disclosed by community’s practices 
as a domain of research14. 
Ontologically understanding is self-projective being towards its potentiality-
for-being. In scrutinizing understanding as an existentiale, Heidegger manages 
to show the priority of the potentiality-for-being over being as actual presence. 
This ontological conclusion presupposes that an analogous priority takes place 
also on ontic level: human beings’ cultural (meaningful) existence is primordial-
ly projected upon horizons of possibilities which get gradually actualized. The 
actualization does not imply a detachment from the potentiality-for-being since 
the actualized remains always already within open horizons. By implication, 
each actual state of existence is always beyond itself. By the same token, those 
who understand themselves with respect to the possibilities they can appropri-
ate have a cultural existence that is always ahead-of-itself. Ontically under-
standing is that characteristic of cultural existence which refers to the capability 
 
 
14 Significant changes in the projected horizon of possibilities entail a new self-understanding of a scien-
tific community as an interpretative community. Thus, for instance, by the mid 1960s scientists in the 
fields of classical enzymology and protein structure were looking for establishing a reliable mechanism of 
how enzymes change shape upon interaction with their substrates. This was a new research situation in 
both fields – a situation that opened many novel research possibilities. The massive experimental con-
firmation (through atomic resolution structures of protein) of the assumption about enzymes’ changing 
shape during the metabolic reactions provoked an essentially new understanding of being researcher in 
the fields of enzymology and protein structure. (The assumption that enzymes change shape upon inter-
action with their substrates is known as the “induced-fit hypothesis” in biochemistry.) 
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of practices to project in their interrelatedness horizons of possibilities, thereby 
making cultural existence itself a practical projection upon possibilities. 
In Section 32 of Being and Time Heidegger introduces the concepts of the 
“fore-structure of understanding” and the “as-structure of interpretation”. They 
refer to the principal ontological features of meaning. A particular task of the 
existential analytic is to reveal the nexus between the two concepts. On a nar-
rower definition, understanding is the horizon whose projection discloses enti-
ties in their possibility. More specifically, an entity within-the-world is projected 
upon the totality of its possible involvements in the world. Thus considered, 
entities have meaning within the projected horizon of understanding (the world) 
which is in a state of ongoing interpretative articulation. The latter consists in a 
constant appropriation and actualization of projected possibilities. Roughly 
speaking, this is the paradigm of the constitutional analysis of meaningful enti-
ties suggested in Being and Time. It postulates that the interpretative articula-
tion of understanding through appropriation of possibilities is the constitution of 
meaning. In this constitution – so Heidegger’s argument goes – the existential-
ontological nexus of the fore-structure of understanding and the as-structure of 
interpretation gets circumscribed in terms of the triad of fore-having, fore-
sight, and fore-conception of “something that becomes meaningful as some-
thing”. I call this circulative nexus the hermeneutic fore-structure of the consti-
tution of meaning. In their fore-structuring entities within-the-world may exist 
both as objects thematically present-at-hand and as instrumental equipments 
in their readiness-t-hand. (Moreover, one and the same entity may exist in 
both ways, depending on its contextual involvements. This is exemplified most 
of all by the entities involved in scientific research.) 
On Heidegger’s ontological construal of the nexus under discussion, in in-
terpretation, understanding as a horizon of possibilities appropriates that which 
is projected by it. Understanding and interpretation are the two sides of one 
existential phenomenon. The projected horizon of possibilities is the world 
which always already transcends what gets articulated within it. Understanding 
is the projected horizon, while the interrelatedness of practices within-the-world 
reveals itself as an ongoing appropriation of possibilities. The appropriation has 
a character of interpretation since it takes on the form of hermeneutic circulari-
ty – the projection of the meaningful whole and the articulation of contextual 
meanings are mutually presupposing each other. 
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A theory of practices that draws on the existential-analytic paradigm of 
meaning constitution should be predicated on the claim that the contextual ar-
rangement of actions enacted by a particular practice is neither determined by 
norms external to practice nor created by an already existing order of the mi-
lieu in which the arrangement occurs. It is the hermeneutic circularity of hori-
zon of understanding and interpretative articulation that creates a dynamic or-
der projected upon possibilities. Nothing gets hypostatized in this hermeneutic 
circularity. By ruling out any causal or normative determination in the constitu-
tion of meaning, the persistence on the projection-articulation hermeneutic cir-
cularity avoids essentialism in a radical manner. Practice’s own normativity is to 
be derived from the triad of fore-sight, fore-having and fore-conception of the 
meaningful entities constituted within practice’s arranged actions. In other 
words, practice’s normativity is generated by (and embedded in) the herme-
neutic circularity of meaning constitution. This proto-normativity contextualizes 
the constitution of meaningful objects (including objects of inquiry in scientific 
research)15. Proto-normativity is constantly produced by the hermeneutic fore-
structuring of interpretation. Now the question arises as what consequences the 
making proto-normativity explicit would have for the process of interpretation. 
 
 
3.  THE CONCEPT OF CHARACTERISTIC HERMENEUTIC SITUATION 
 
Let me summarize the considerations of the preceding section. The ontolog-
ical theory of interpretation (as inspired by Heidegger’s existential analytic) as-
sumes that interpretation is a dimension of all practices within-the-world. The 
agents are interpreting themselves and the particular contexts and situations of 
their activities and practices. The ontic level of (the universality of) interpreta-
tion takes into consideration the fact that human beings are doomed to be in-
terpretative creatures16. The ontic level addresses first and foremost the con-
 
 
15 On the notion of “proto-normativity” as related to the hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific re-
search, see Dimitri Ginev, The Context of Constitution. Beyond the Edge of Justification, Dordrecht, 
Boston: Springer, 2006, pp. 161-194. 
16 The claim that the agents’ self-reflective stance conditions the active appropriation of possibilities as 
an ongoing construction of identity takes a central place in all versions of ethnomethodology as well. On 
Garfinkel’s celebrated view, because the agents are constantly interpreting their situatedness in the 
world they are articulating, they are not “cultural dopes”. This view, however, involves the wrong as-
sumption that the life-forms internal (vernacular) interpretative methods and practices can be only sub-
jected to a pure description. Just because the interpretative being-in-the-world characterizes the life-
forms’ modes of being as a potentiality-for-being, a pure description of agents’ interpretative self-
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tinuous construction of identity of a life-form’s participants. Those who are in-
volved in (the historical re-production of) a life-form are constructing their 
identity by appropriating possibilities that are contextually projected. Studies on 
this level take on the form of interpretative inquiries into the changing regimes 
of interpretative communities’ self-understanding upon possibilities that are 
projected as contextually changing horizons. The construction of identity is a 
never-ending process since the horizon of possibilities remains always open. In 
interpreting themselves within their situatedness in the world, human beings 
are disclosing the interpretative nature of their being-in-the-world. 
In reaching this conclusion, one is approaching the ontological level of in-
terpretation. On this level interpretation is to be attributed to the meaning as 
facticity, existentiality, and being-fallen. The two levels are intertwined. The 
relationship between the levels is one of fore-structuring. The double herme-
neutics involves a transcendental reflection that has to establish the conditions 
of having interpretative articulation of a certain kind. The circularity of under-
standing and interpretation that constitutes meaning takes place in scientific 
research as well. My contention is that by scrutinizing the hermeneutic fore-
structuring of scientific research, one can apply the transcendental reflection 
involved in the double hermeneutics to specifying epistemological conditions of 
(and constrains on) scientific research as an interpretative process. A herme-
neutic theory of scientific research should portray the process of research in 
terms of changing configurations of interrelated practices 17 . Each particular 
configuration defines a situation in the development of this process. The situa-
tion’s outcome is the articulation of the domain of research in a certain way (for 
instance, creating new empirical models of domain’s central theory). The articu-
lation brings into being a range of meaningful entities that exist within the situ-
ation’s contextualized spaces of representation. (Examples of such spaces are a 
phase diagram, a statistical ensemble of experimental results, a network of 
quantifiable data achieved by calibrated instruments, an algebraic model of 
measurements, a particular solution of a system of differential equations, or a 
semantic model of a theory’s formalism. To make use of Nelson Goodman’s cel-
 
 
understanding (i.e. a description that presupposes a pure presence of methods and practices as some-
thing that is present-at-hand) is to be rejected from a hermeneutic point of view. 
17 On a detailed discussion of this theory see, Dimitri Ginev, The Tenets of Cognitive Existentialism, Ath-
ens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2011. 
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ebrated distinction, in all of these cases one has in mind “representation as” 
and not “representation of”18.) In representing meaningful entities, one con-
stantly reads them within the horizon projected by the situation’s configuration 
of practices. Thus, the entities’ actual presence in the situation is contextually 
relative, being subjected to their projection upon possibilities (i.e. to their po-
tentiality-for-being). 
The concept of the “hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research” 
comes to the fore as a result of the efforts to specify the circular nexus of un-
derstanding and interpretation with regard to the constitution of scientific ob-
jects and the articulation of domains of research. Following the preceding por-
trayal, the manifolds of activities in scientific research become organized as 
interpretative practices by means of their capacity to serve the function of 
(what Patrick Heelan calls) “readable technologies”19. Scientific research is a 
process of reading within particular spaces of representation. In this process 
one reads instruments, theoretical concepts, experimental results, measure-
ments, partial differential equations, diagrams, etc. Interpretative practices of 
scientific research should be distinguished by a potentiality to constitute 
through readable technologies the relevant objects of inquiry within the milieu 
of the situation’s meaningful entities. By contextualizing the research process 
within a configuration of practices, one calls into existence entities that retain 
their status to be at instrumental disposal (within normal science’s laboratory 
everydayness), and nevertheless become (under certain conditions) isolable 
from the context as “thematically given objects” whose identification depends 
totally on epistemological norms and criteria. 
In other words, these objects are at once ready-to-hand in their manipula-
bility and present-at-hand in their objectifying identification by means of epis-
temic procedures. This dual status corresponds to the duality inherent in each 
configuration of scientific practices that manages both to provide a leeway of 
possible involvements of what is ready-to-hand in its own context and to disen-
tangle what is constituted from the context, thereby representing the disentan-
gled things as relatively stable objects amenable to a characterization by math-
 
 
18 On the notion of science’s spaces of representation see, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Toward a history of 
epistemic things: synthesizing proteins in the test tube, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. 
19  See Patrick Heelan, “Natural Science as Hermeneutic of Instrumentation,” Philosophy of Science, 
50(1983), pp. 181-204. 
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ematically idealized predicates. In the natural sciences, each scientific practice 
is at once a device of reading something ready-to-hand and a means for objec-
tifying something (as an experimental outcome, a formalized object character-
ized by the possible values of parameters expressible by measurement scales, 
an idealized replica of a phenomenal system, a data-model, a physical system’s 
behavior that consists in changing states over time and so on). Thus, the em-
ployment of readable technologies within spaces of scientific representation 
correlates necessarily with objectifying something that is characterized by a 
stable semantic (for instance, the empirical content of a theoretical concept, or 
the possible models of a theory’s mathematical formalism). 
More generally, the interpretative process of reading is always comple-
mented by a process of semantic codification of what gets read. Yet the entities 
and structures which are objectified and semantically codified remain within 
horizons of possible further reading. Their semantic content is always predicat-
ed on a contextual underdetermination that is to be related to Quine’s criteria 
of the existence of science’s objects. The objectified entities are distinguished 
by verifiable predicates in a manner that allows their identification through pro-
cedures subjected to epistemological norms. In this regard, interpretative fore-
structuring means anticipating (seeing, having and grasping in advance) the 
ascertainment of a formalizable and verifiable predicate of an entity that is “al-
ways already” within the configuration of practices which gives rise to the pred-
ication. In addressing the hermeneutic fore-structuring with regard to the pred-
icates assigned to the epistemologically identifiable objects, one is preoccupied 
with the contextual reading/representing that delineates those phenomena 
which are to be included in the predicate’s extension. Scientific practices man-
age to read something-as-something (thereby retaining its status of something 
ready-to-hand) while the reading process singles out verifiable predicates. Here 
the “as” has the character of a “hermeneutic as”. It is the modes of employing 
readable technologies that work against increasing the contextual 
underdetermination, without destroying the primacy of the “hermeneutic as” of 
interpretation. 
On this account, the way in which the semantic codification (of what is ac-
tualized in a configuration of scientific practices) complements the interpreta-
tive openness of reading proves to be a derivate of a more general complemen-
tarity within the reading process of scientific research – that between contextu-
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alizing interpretation and objectifying predication that makes present. By 
means of this complementarity the reading process of scientific research suc-
ceeds in reducing not only the contextual underdetermination, but most of all 
its epistemological indeterminacy. The modes of employing readable technolo-
gies in scientific research bring into play a participants’ reflexivity about the 
fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception of their reading within contextual-
ized spaces of representation. In engaging in such reflexivity they constantly 
make explicit the proto-normativity embedded in the hermeneutic fore-
structure. This proto-normativity comes to the surface as explicit epistemologi-
cal norms and criteria, whereby one is able to set up constrains on the inde-
terminacy of interpretation. 
It is the complementarity between contextualizing interpretation and objec-
tifying predication that specifies the hermeneutic fore-structuring as a charac-
teristic hermeneutic situation. Making proto-normativity explicit helps one to 
define the balance between interpretation and objectification within the re-
search process’ reading. This balance transcends the particular situations (con-
figurations of practices) of scientific research. The hermeneutic fore-structure is 
inevitably situationally circumscribed. It is palpable through the fore-having, 
fore-seeing, and fore-grasping the research objects which become constituted 
by actualizing possibilities projected by the situation’s configuration of practic-
es. The triad of fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception is “inscribed” in the 
readable technologies and the spaces of representation put forward by the con-
figuration. The particular hermeneutic fore-structure gets changed when the 
configuration of practices is modified, and the research process is accordingly 
re-contextualized. The new regime of contextual reading is projected upon new 
possibilities. Yet, in contrast to the particular interpretative fore-structures of 
reading, the hermeneutic fore-structuring of a research process is potentially 
ceaseless. The reading taking place in a research process is characterized by 
constitutive hermeneutic features that persist in the particular situations, con-
texts, and changing configurations. A characteristic hermeneutic situation en-
compasses these features, and refers to the research process en bloc. It char-
acterizes the continuous hermeneutic fore-structuring of this process. 
Let me finally change slightly the perspective. Thanks to the complementa-
rity between contextualizing interpretation and objectifying predication the con-
textually operative “hermeneutic as” in the research process fore-structures the 
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structure of objectification by means of which something acquires the status of 
an epistemologically identifiable object. Thus considered, the objects exists in 
accordance with the epistemological norms and criteria of its identification. 
Quine’s celebrated dictum that to exist means to be a value of quantifiable var-
iable provides the standard criterion for identifying and authenticating objects’ 
existence within a theoretical framework. On another Quinean formulation, 
closer to the doctrine of ontological commitment, scientists use variables rang-
ing over mathematical entities and are committed to their existence. Such cri-
teria give answers to the question as to how to identify the existence of (math-
ematical, theoretical, experimental and other) objects within the discursive 
framework by means of which the respective objectification has been put into 
play. 
Granted that the objectifying predication is at the same time a de-
contextualization of entities that have been read in contextualized spaces of 
representation, a characteristic hermeneutic situation is defined by a balance 
between contextualization and de-contextualization as well. Idealization, for-
malization, and deductive-nomological explanation are typical practices of de-
contextualization. Yet these practices are always contextualized by being in-
volved in configurations with other practices. De-contextualization in scientific 
research is indispensably contextualized, and fore-structured. By implication, 
the epistemological norms and criteria tied up to de-contextualizing practices 
can only constrain the interpretative contextualization by being at the same 
time interpretatively fore-structured. To sum up, elaborating on the concept of 
characteristic hermeneutic situation promises a philosophical universalizing of 
hermeneutics that leaves enough room for a non-representationalist epistemol-
ogy. 
  
 
